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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider long-term risk-sharing1 labour contracts under limited
commitment. Firms and workers are allowed to sign, or implicitly agree to, contin-
gent contracts but also to renege on these contracts when it is to their advantage.
That is to say, there are no courts to enforce contracts and low mobility or lock-in
costs. We rst develop a general framework for analysing contracts in this class of
repeated interactions. The logic of these contracts follows that of repeated games,
in that a party called upon to sacrice current utility to maintain the insurance is
prepared to do so in anticipation of receiving reciprocal benets in the future. How-
ever in general rst-best risk sharing cannot be achieved, and it is what happens
in the second best contracts which is of particular interest. What then follows is a
selective overview of the existing literature that considers both the implications for
empirical testing and summarises the available empirical evidence.
The study of long-term labour contracts with limited commitment is impor-
tant because other standard models of the labour market cannot easily account for
observed patterns in the data. The data typically show that real wages are only
weakly correlated with productivity or even mildly countercyclical. Hours on the
other hand are found to be quite strongly positively correlated with productivity. To
match this observed pattern in the data using standard real business cycle models
requires a very high intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labour supply that
is not supported by estimates from micro data. Recently Shimer (2005) has sug-
gested that standard search models under-predict the volatilities of vacancies and
unemployment because of the exibility of wage responses to productivity under
Nash bargaining unless implausibly large shocks for productivity are assumed. We
therefore consider some of the available empirical evidence on whether these puzzles
might be resolved within the limited commitment labour contracting model.
We start by developing a basic two agent (worker/rm) model in which either
agent can quit the relationship at any time either at a positive or zero cost. The
agents agree initially to a contingent sequence of wages (and potentially a termina-
1Thus we do not consider the other much analysed motive for contracting, namely to protect re-
lationship specic investments from opportunistic behaviour. For a discussion of this, see MacLeod
(2007, Current Issue).
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tion rule) which satises certain incentive or participation constraints. The outside
environment is summarised by the evolution of the respective outside options for the
two agents. The basic characterisation of second-best contracts can then be applied
to specic models, and we do this to summarise the existing theoretical work in the
area. In the development of the model we do not use the dynamic programming
framework that is usually employed for this environment, but instead show that the
model can be solved by using local variational arguments, thus avoiding the need to
establish a number of technical properties of value functions.
Although the basic characterisations of the second-best contracts have been
known for some time, in the second part of the paper we consider how the outside
options of the agents can be made endogenous in search equilibrium models or
competitive models with perfect labour mobility. There has been a recent upsurge
of interest in applications of this type of model to macroeconomics, and of testing of
the model particularly in the one-sided limited commitment case where workers are
mobile but rms can commit. We summarise the main ndings of the literature and
the empirical evidence which is generally very supportive of the one-sided model.
2 A general model of limited commitment
This section considers a general model of limited commitment. We rst derive the
implications of optimum contracting in a simple model with xed hours and consider
the test of this model by Macis (2006). Section 2.2 considers the modication of the
model when hours are variable and reports on the results of Beaudry & DiNardo
(1995) on the implied negative correlation between hours and wages. Section 2.3
examines the implications of quitting or reneging costs.
2.1 A baseline model
The model is as follows.2 There is an innite horizon, t = 1; 2; 3 : : :1. Workers are
risk averse with per period twice di¤erentiable utility function u(c), u0 > 0; u00 < 0,
2A description of a general limited commitment model of risk-sharing can be found in Ljungqvist
& Sargent (2004, Chapter 20).
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where c  0 is the income/consumption of the single good received within the period;
crucially, it is assumed that they cannot make capital market transactions, so the
only possibility for consumption smoothing across states of nature or over time arises
if the rm provides insurance. There is no disutility of work, but hours are xed so
that workers are either employed or unemployed (although we relax the assumption
of xed hours below). The rm is assumed to be risk neutral. We consider a single
match between one worker and one rm,3 and for the moment we do not need to ll
in the details of the outside environment. There is perfect information within the
match. We suppose that output at time t within this match is z(st)  0, where st
is the current state of nature.4 The state of nature st follows a time-homogeneous
Markov process, with nite state space S, and initial distribution p over S, and from
state s state r 2 S is reachable next period with transition probability: sr  0.
Let ht := (s1; s2; : : : ; st) be the history at t. Workers and rms discount the future
with common discount factor  2 (0; 1).
At the start of date 1, after the initial state s1 is observed,5 the rm o¤ers
the worker a contract (wt(ht))
T
t=1 = ((w1(s1); w2(s1; s2); w3(s1; s2; s3); : : :)), where
wt (ht)  0 is the wage at t after history ht, and T > 1 is the (random) date at
which the contract is terminated.6 The within period timing is as follows. At the
start of each period, both agents observe the current state of nature, st. At this
point either party can quit and take their outside option. Otherwise, they trade at
the agreed terms, in which case the value of output z (st) is realised, and the rm
then makes a wage payment according to the contract. (Thus we do not allow for
example for the rm to renege on its wage payment after the worker has contributed
3That is we shall treat contracts between each rm and worker separately. The case where
contracts with di¤erent workers cannot be treated separately is studied in Martins, Snell & Thomas
(2005) and Snell & Thomas (2006) and discussed briey in Section 2.3.
4We do not identify the state of nature directly with productivity, z, as it may be that other
rms face di¤erent productivity shocks, and so the outside options will not be determined by
the match productivity. In fact, even if there is a common productivity shock, because optimal
contracts do not necessarily express current wages as a function of only the current state, the
outside option may not be a function of the current state only (although in most models the payo¤
from a new contract, and hence the outside option, will only depend on the current state).
5If matches also start at later dates, the characterisation developed below, which depends only
on the state prevailing at the time the contract starts, is the same.
6So that at t = T , after observing the current state st, the partnership dissolves and both
agents get their outside options. T is a random variable (a stopping time) so that the length of the
contract will in general depend on the history of shocks. At this level of generality, termination
must be allowed for as there may be no continuation values that satisfy participation constraints.
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to output.) The value (discounted utility) of the outside option for the worker
and rm respectively is denoted by w (s) and f (s) in state s.
7 We assume that
w (s)  Cw > u (0) = (1  ) :
Let Vt (ht) denote the continuation utility from t onwards from the contract
(assuming it does not terminate at t):
Vt (ht) := u(wt(ht)) + E
"
T 1X
t0=t+1
t
0 tu(wt0(ht0)) + 
T tw (sT ) j ht
#
; (1)
where E denotes expectation. Likewise the rms continuation prot is
t (ht) := z (st)  wt(ht) + E
"
T 1X
t0=t+1
t
0 t (z (st0)  wt0(ht0)) j ht
#
: (2)
The contract is said to be self-enforcing if the following hold for all dates t, T   1 
t  1, and for all positive probability ht (with initial state s1):
Vt (ht)  w (st)  Cw; (3)
t (ht)  f (st)  Cf ; (4)
where Cf and Cw are respective directly incurred quitting/mobility costs for the
rm and worker.8 Inequality (3) is the workers participation constraint that says
that at any point in the future the contract must o¤er at least what a worker can
get by quitting, net of quitting costs, while (4) is the corresponding constraint for
the rm.9
7In much of the existing literature it is assumed that competition among rms drives prots
to zero from new matches so f = 0. Even with comptition, if other inputs such as capital were
included in the rms prots, then the participation constraint for the rm would require that it
covers capital costs. This would make the rms outside option state dependent if say, the interest
rate varied with the state. See Calmès (2007) for a model including a xed capital component
where the rms outside option is state dependent.
8Either party can initiate termination, but both su¤er the costs. We assume that these are also
incurred if the contract is terminated by agreement (i.e. at t = T ), so they are costs which cannot
be avoided on match break-up. It would be equivalent to factor these directly into outside options.
See Section 2.3 for discussion of alternative assumptions.
9It is also possible to introduce hiring costs for the rm. The contract dynamics do not depend
on whether there are hiring costs (unlike quitting costs which may potentially a¤ect the contract
dynamics, see Section 2.3 below), but apply as soon as a relationship is established. Thus if the
rm incurs hiring costs to establish a relationship, to judge the protability of the relationship it
would have to subtract them from whatever surplus it makes once the relationship is established
in the manner to be described.
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We are interested in constrained e¢ cient contracts, that is to say contracts
which are self enforcing and are not Pareto dominated by any other self-enforcing
contracts. E¢ cient contracts are thus solutions to the following problem:
max
(wt(ht))
T
t=1
1 (h1) Problem A
subject to (3), (4), and
V1 (h1)  V1: (5)
The term V1 measures how much utility the worker gets from the relationship, and
as this is varied across feasible values (i.e. values for which self-enforcing contract
exist), all e¢ cient contracts are traced out.10
Lemma 1 In an e¢ cient contract in which the rms (workers) participation con-
straint is slack at t+ 1, wages cannot fall (rise) between t and t+ 1.
Proof. Suppose we are at ht, and suppose that the rmss participation con-
straint at t + 1 in some state s is not binding. By assumption the contract is not
terminated at t+1 (otherwise the constraint would trivially bind). Consider, start-
ing from the optimal contract, reshu­ ing wages between t, and t + 1 in state s; to
backload them (assume wt > 0). Increase the wage at t+ 1 after state s by a small
amount , and cut the wage at t by x so as to leave the worker indi¤erent; do not
change the contract otherwise:
stsu
0 (wt+1(ht; s))  u0 (wt(ht))x ' 0:
This backloading satises all worker participation constraints since the workers
utility rises at t + 1, and so even if her constraint were binding, it will not be
violated; at t her constraint holds as her utility is unchanged, and likewise it is
unchanged earlier since utility is held constant over the two periods. The change in
prots (viewed from ht) is
 sts+ x '  sts+
stsu
0 (wt+1(ht; s))
u0 (wt(ht))
;
10The issue of existence of solutions to this problem for feasible V1 is standard in this environment.
5
which is positive for  small enough if
u0 (wt+1(ht; s))
u0 (wt(ht))
> 1: (6)
If (6) holds (so that wages are falling), then the backloading would raise prots at t,
so the rms participation constraint would hold at t, and at t+1 by assumption the
rms participation constraint is slack, so a small change to the wage will not violate
it. Thus all constraints are satised by this change, and prots have increased,
contrary to the optimality of the original contract. So (6) cannot hold: marginal
utility growth cannot be positive, or equivalently, wages cannot fall . By a symmetric
argument if the workers participation constraint is slack at t+1, then wages cannot
rise between t and t+ 1.11
Next, we need to characterise more precisely what happens to the wage when
one of the participation constraints binds. First, let
 
wt( V1; s)
T
t=1
be an optimal
contract in Problem A starting from state s1 = s. This must deliver precisely V1 to
the worker, otherwise we can cut the period 1 wage without violating the workers
constraint, thus increasing prots.12 We dene ws := w1(w (s)   Cw; s), i.e. the
period 1 wage specied by an optimal contract starting in state s which delivers
exactly the workers net outside option, V1 = w (s)   Cw. It must be unique by a
simple convexity argument (see below). A key observation is the following: it must
be optimal at any date t in state s to set wt = ws whenever Vt (ht) = w (s)  Cw.
This follows from the fact that the future distribution over states depends only on
s, and that the continuation contract must itself be optimal (otherwise replacing
the continuation contract by a lower cost one which delivered the same continuation
utility would reduce the initial costs but satisfy all participation constraints). Thus,
ws is the wage in state s at any t if the participation constraint is binding. Similarly
dene ws to be the period 1 wage specied by an optimal contract starting in state
s which delivers prots of exactly f (s)  Cf .
11Suppose that the strict opposite of (6) holds, u0 (wt+1(ht; s))=u0 (wt(ht)) < 1. The reverse
argument can be used: frontloading would be protable but it might violate the workers t + 1
participation constraint, since wages fall at this point. In other words, if the workers participation
constraint is slack at t + 1, wages cannot rise, but we cannot rule out a rise when this constraint
is binding.
12Provided w1 > 0; otherwise, since it is assumed that the outside option dominates zero con-
sumption for ever, it is easily shown that there must be a point in the future at which wt > 0 and
the workers constraint is not binding, so wages can be cut at this point instead.
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It can then be established that if an optimal contract o¤ers a higher utility,
then it must o¤er a higher rst period wage:
Lemma 2 If V 0 > V , then w1(V 0; s) > w1(V ; s).
Proof. Assume otherwise, so that w1(V 0; s)  w1(V ; s). Suppose at some
point in the future on some path ht that wt(V 0; s) > wt(V ; s) for the rst time,
and the discounted utility from t is higher in the V 0 contract. This ht must exist
as the V 0 contract o¤ers higher utility. This implies that wage growth between
t   1 and t is greater in the V 0 case, which from Lemma 1 can only be true if
one or both of the following occur: (i) the workers participation constraint binds
at t for the V 0 contract; (ii) the rms constraint binds in the V contract. In
case (i) in the V 0 contract, wages are weakly lower than in the V contract until
minimum continuation utility is obtained (so the V contract cannot o¤er less from
this point); thus discounted utility cannot be greater in the V 0 contract, contrary
to assumption. In case (ii) in the V 0 contract, wages are weakly lower than in the
V contract until maximum continuation utility is obtained in the V contract, again
contrary to assumption.
Proposition 3 An optimal contract evolves according to the following updating rule.
In state s 2 S either (a) the contract (always) terminates, or (b) there is associated
a minimum and a maximum wage, ws and ws respectively (ws  ws), such that in
an optimal contract if at date t+1 state st+1 occurs then wt+1 is updated from wt by
wt+1 =
8><>:
wst+1 if wt > wst+1 ;
wt if wt 2

wst+1 ; wst+1

;
wst+1 if wt < wst+1 :
Proof. If there exist self-enforcing continuation utilities from s (i.e. if a self-
enforcing contract exists) then by denition an e¢ cient contract should continue as
each player gets at least their outside option, and cannot be worse o¤. Otherwise
termination must occur. Thus we assume w.l.o.g. that termination does not occur
at s for the remainder of the proof. We start by showing that ws is unique. Suppose
otherwise: then there are two distinct contracts that deliver w (s) Cw to a worker,
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both of which satisfy participation constraints and yield the same costs. Take a strict
convex combination of these two contracts (i.e., a convex combination of wages at
each ht). From (1) and the concavity of u() it is clear this increases a workers utility,
and satises the participation constraint at each point. Costs are linear in wages, and
hence are unchanged. Thus a small reduction in the initial wage (in state s) will still
satisfy participation, and will lead to lower costs, a contradiction. So ws is unique.
Likewise ws is unique. Moreover, by Lemma 2, ws  ws since a contract that delivers
the rm  Cf (i.e., corresponding to ws) must deliver the worker at least w (s) Cw
(i.e. corresponding to ws); otherwise the workers participation constraint would be
violated. Next, suppose that wst+1 < wst+1 and wt 2
 
wst+1 ; wst+1

. If the workers
participation constraint at t+1 in state st+1 binds, wt+1 = wst+1 , i.e., wages fall (as
wt > wst+1), but then the rms constraint is slack (wt+1 6= wst+1), so this contradicts
Lemma 1 which asserts that wages do not fall. Thus the workers constraint does not
hold, and we know from Lemma 1 that wages cannot rise. Likewise as wt < wst+1 the
workers constraint cannot bind, and wages cannot fall. Thus for wt 2
 
wst+1 ; wst+1

,
wages remain constant. Conversely, if wt  wst+1, then if the workers constraint
does not hold (Vt+1 > w (st+1)   Cw), by Lemma 1 wages cannot rise, so wt+1 
wst+1. However, Vt+1 > w (st+1)   Cw would imply by Lemma 2 (comparing with
the contract that delivers w (st+1)   Cw) that wt+1 > wst+1, a contradiction. So
the constraint binds and wt+1 = wst+1. A symmetrical argument establishes that
wt+1 = wst+1 if wt > wst+1 .
Thus wages evolve in a simple fashion: they remain constant unless this takes
the wage outside the interval of e¢ cient wages [ws; ws] for the current state, in which
case the wage changes by the minimum amount needed to bring it into this interval.
The only thing remaining to be determined is the initial wage, w1(s1). This will be
determined by V1 in Problem A, and this can in turn be thought of as depending
on the bargaining strengths of the two parties or the initial outside options of the
two parties. By varying the initial wage all possible splits of the joint surplus will
be traced out.13
13For an intuitive derivation of a version of this proposition, including a discussion of when
termination occurs, see Malcomson (1999).
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The state-dependent wage intervals [ws; ws] will in general depend on all the pa-
rameters of the model including the workers preferences and the stochastic process
for productivity. However, the outside options and the quitting and mobility costs
Cw and Cf , will also play a crucial role in the determination of these interval end-
points. We will provide the more specic assumptions in various models as we
encounter them. In the rst paper to analyse a problem of this type, Thomas &
Worrall (1988), it is assumed that Cw and Cf are zero, and if a worker reneges,
thereafter he or she can nd work only at the spot market wage, where because
of competition among rms, the wage equals current productivity z(st) (which is
assumed to be a common shock across all rms). Similarly, if a rm reneges it is
assumed it can hire at the spot market rate. This may be motivated as follows.
Suppose there are, in addition to innitely lived workers and rms, at each date m
workers and n rms, n > m, who live for only one period. Since there is no enforce-
ment mechanism and no mobility costs, the one-period-lived agents trade at the
spot market wage. The innitely lived agents are competitive and thus treat these
spot market wages as given. This is then in line with reputation models of repeated
games, and corresponds to the most severe credible punishment. It requires that
when an agent reneges he is observed by everyone else, and once he has reneged
he has proved himself unreliable and no one will sign a contract with him again.
Likewise for a rm which has reneged in the past. The implication is that a worker
who reneges will receive a consumption stream equal to productivity at each date,
and so w(s) equals the discounted expected utility generated by this stream.
The most direct testing of the implications of this two-sided model is by Macis
(2006), using Italian panel data on a sample of 1500 rms which includes detailed
information on all workers with these rms.14 He conducts a number of tests. One
test, which extends the approach of Beaudry & DiNardo (1991) discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2 below, is to allow both the best and worst realisations of outside opportuni-
ties (proxied by unemployment rates) since the start of the employment relationship.
Controlling for current outside opportunities, and other observable characteristics
14It should be noted that it is di¢ cult to distinguish the limited commitment hypothesis from
that of e¢ cient incomplete contracts to overcome hold-up when there are exogenous switching
costs (MacLeod & Malcomson (1993); see also Malcomson (1997)). The latter can also however
rationalise rigid nominal contracts, something that the risk-sharing approach cannot.
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of both workers and rms, current wages respond to both the lowest and the highest
unemployment rates recorded since the start of the employment relationship. The
fact that both the best and worst labor market conditions since hiring have a signi-
cant impact on current wages suggests that both the workers and the rms outside
option constraints matter. It should however be noted that Grant (2003) also used
the highest unemployment rate in a similar analysis of U.S. data, and found less
evidence for its signicance, while Devereux & Hart (2007, Current Issue) did nd
it to be either insignicant or largely incorrectly signed in U.K. data.15
A second implication of the model is that cohort e¤ects di¤erences between
wages for di¤erent entry cohorts within a rm will tend not to persist. The wage
intervals will be cohort independent, so that a large change in outside opportunities
should eliminate any di¤erences if all cohorts need to renegotiate(have binding
self-enforcing constraints). Consistent with this, Macis nds that the correlation
between the unemployment rate prevailing at the time of hiring and current wages
declines with tenure. A further test is based on the following observation: if a
workers wage rose between t   1 and t, then according to the model he is con-
strained at t. This implies an asymmetric response to changes in outside options.
Suppose rst that unemployment rises in the next period between t and t + 1 so
that the workers outside option worsens. This should relax the constraint, and
certainly a small change should not imply that the rms constraint binds, so the
wage will be unchanged; a larger rise in unemployment will however cause the rms
constraint to bind and the wage to fall. On the other hand, if unemployment falls,
the improvement in the workers outside option will further tighten the constraint,
pushing up the wage, even if this change is small. This is what Macis nds in the
data. However the prediction should also work in the opposite direction when wages
fall between t  1 and t, so that the rms constraint can be assumed to be binding,
but in this case small increases in unemployment at t + 1 (which should further
tighten the rms constraint) do not appear to reduce wages.
15Grant (2003) nds maximum unemployment to matter in a basic individual xed e¤ects spec-
ication, but not if year and tenure dummies are included (whereas the e¤ect of minimum unem-
ployment is largely robust to these additions; see Section 3.2).
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2.2 Introducing variable hours
The baseline model presented above is important in understanding the behaviour
of wages as the insurance motive partially disassociates wages from productivity.
It is commonly observed in many countries that labour market uctuations are
characterised by large procyclical variations in hours, but far smaller variations in
wages. It has been suggested that the insurance provided in wage contracts can help
explain this (Rosen (1985), Azariadis (1975)). Abowd & Card (1987) and Boldrin
& Horvath (1995) have tested the implicit contract model of full insurance against
the spot market alternative and have found some weak support for the contracting
hypothesis over the alternative.
In order to address the behaviour of both wages and hours in the limited com-
mitment model this subsection shows how the baseline model presented above can be
extended to allow for joint determination of wages and hours within the contract.16
In this case a contract will specify not only a prole for wages (wt(ht))
T
t=1 but also
a prole for hours worked (Ht(ht))
T
t=1. It is assumed that the worker has per-period
twice di¤erentiable strictly concave utility function u(c;H) where work is disliked,
so uH < 0. It will further be assumed that leisure is a normal good so that the
Engel curve for hours worked is downward sloping. In the previous model we were
implicitly assuming that hours were xed, say at 1 unit and u(c) = u(c; 1). As be-
fore it is assumed that workers cannot engage in capital market transactions so that
consumption is equal to earnings, c(ht) = w(ht)H(ht). The continuation utilities are
dened analogously to equations (1) and (2) but with the per-period payo¤s of the
worker and the rm are replaced by u(ct(ht); H(ht)) and z (st)H(ht) ct(ht) respec-
tively. The self-enforcing constraints are then still given by equations (3) and (4)
and constrained e¢ cient contracts can be found by solving
max
(ct(ht);Ht(ht))
T
t=1
1 (h1) Problem A0
subject to (3), (4), and (5). Again if matches start at a later date the characterisation
is exactly the same as it depends only on the state in which the match is initiated.
16See also Malcomson (1999).
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The rst thing to note about the solution to Problem A0 is that hours will be
chosen e¢ ciently so that for every history17
  uH(ct(ht); Ht(ht))
uc(ct(ht); Ht(ht))
= z(st): (7)
To see this consider a pure intratemporal reallocation of consumption and hours that
leaves prots unchanged. That is consider a change in consumption of c and a
change in hours H such that c = zH. The net e¤ect on utility is approximately
uc(c;H)c + uH(c;H)H = (uc(c;H)z + uH(c;H))H. Thus if  uH=uc < z a
small decrease in hours, H < 0 would raise utility and if  uH=uc > z a small
increase in hours would raise utility. Hence at the optimum (7) must hold. The
reason why this condition holds is that the self-enforcing constraints are concerned
only with the intertemporal allocation and thus do not interfere with the e¢ cient
intratemporal allocation of hours.18
It is further possible to nd the updating rule analogous to Proposition 3. To
do this we dene the marginal utility of consumption
t(ht) = uc(ct(ht); Ht(ht)): (8)
Associated with each state st+1 is an interval

st+1 ; st+1

and the updating rule for
 is given by
t+1 =
8><>:
st+1 if t > st+1 ;
t if t 2

st+1 ; st+1

;
st+1 if t < st+1 :
(9)
Here st+1 is the value of  which delivers the exactly the workers outside option
and st+1 is the value that delivers the rms outside option. The initial value of
 will be determined by the bargaining strength or initial outside options of the
parties as reected by V1 in equation (5).19 It is easy to see that if hours are xed
then st+1 = u
0(wst+1) and st+1 = u
0(wst+1).
17This was rst pointed out in Beaudry & DiNardo (1995).
18If there were also a moral hazard or adverse selection problem then (7) would not hold and
in general there would be an interaction between the intratemporal and intertemporal allocation
problems.
19Here  is the inverse of the multiplier on inequality (5) in Problem A0. Thus a lower value of
 corresponds to a greater bargaining strength for the worker. See Sigouin (2004) for a derivation
of the updating rule in the case of separable preferences.
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To consider the contractual solution for the path of wages and hours, rst
consider the following two equations
uc(c;H) =  (10)
 uH(c;H) = z: (11)
The solutions to the two equations (10) and (11) are the Frisch-type demand func-
tions c(; z) and H(; z).20 It is easy to check that provided leisure is a normal
good, the hours function H(; z) is increasing in  and z. The intuition is that a
decrease in  holding z xed, and hence holding the marginal rate of substitution
constant, is a pure positive income e¤ect and therefore, because leisure is normal,
leads to a decrease in hours worked. Equally, an increase in productivity holding
the marginal utility of consumption, , xed leads to a substitution e¤ect and there-
fore an increase in hours worked. It can also be checked that the function c(; z)
is decreasing in  provided consumption is normal.21 In the limited commitment
contractual solution consumption and hours satisfy equations (10) and (11) where at
each history consumption equals earnings, ct(ht) = wt(ht)Ht(ht), and t(ht) satises
equation (8) and follows the updating rule given by equation (9). It follows from
the equation of earnings and consumption, that provided consumption is normal,
the contractual wage rate is decreasing in  and z.22
The implications of the model have been considered and tested by Beaudry &
DiNardo (1995). Consider rst the case of complete insurance so that  is xed
and determined by the initial bargaining position at the time the contract is begun.
This may vary from worker to worker. Thus workers who enter the contract with a
better bargaining position will in any given state (and hence productivity z) have
higher wage rates and lower hours. Looking at a cross section of workers therefore
it is to be expected that hours are negatively related to wage rates. This is to be
20These are Frisch-type as Frisch demand functions are derived by keeping the marginal utility
of wealth constant and where the marginal rate of substitution equals the real wage (see below).
21The e¤ect of an increase in z on consumption is ambiguous and depends on whether the
marginal utility of consumption increases or decreases with hours worked (i.e. on the sign of ucH):
if utility is separable, consumption is independent of z for a xed .
22This is easy to see if utility is separable in consumption and hours worked: with z xed an
increase in  increases the marginal disutility of labour and hence the hours worked. Equally an
increase in  increases the marginal utility of consumption so that consumption or earnings is
decreased. Since hours are increased it follows that the wage rate falls. A separable formulation
for preferences is used by Sigouin (2004) in his search model (see Section 3.1 below).
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contrasted with the standard intertemporal model of labour supply. In that model
equations (10) and (11) apply with z = w and with  determined by an Euler equa-
tion of the form t = (1+ rt)E[t+1] where rt is the interest rate on borrowing and
lending. Since the standard intertemporal model of labour supply allows the worker
to self-insure through borrowing and lending, earnings need not equal consumption
and therefore it follows directly from equation (11) with z replaced by the wage
rate w that the Frisch labour supply function H(;w) is increasing in w holding 
xed provided only that the marginal disutility of work is increasing. This is the
intertemporal substitution e¤ect that as wages rise more hours of work are supplied
so that wages and hours should be positively associated holding the marginal utility
of wealth xed. Of course  will not in general be constant over time and therefore
the long-run elasticity of wages on hours will depend on the evolution of .
Beaudry & DiNardo (1995) also consider the implications of the case where
the participation constraints are binding in some states. Depending on the history
of states any individual worker may have any t(ht) 2 [st ; st ] for a given state
and productivity z(st). This has three important e¤ects. First although di¤erent
workers initially employed at di¤erent dates may have di¤erent s, as soon as both
workers are constrained in a particular state (or the rm is constrained for both
workers), their s will be equalised and therefore they will have the same wages and
hours in subsequent periods. Thus the cross-sectional variation in wages and hours
across employees should be lower with increasing tenure. Second, for any worker
who is constrained following an increase in productivity, there will be a decrease in
 and two o¤setting e¤ects: the hours worked will increase because of the increase in
productivity but the decrease in  will o¤set this and tend to reduce hours worked.
Similarly the wage rate will rise because of the decrease in  but fall because of the
increase in productivity. Thus the model will predict an ambiguous or weak e¤ect of
changes in productivity on hours and wage rates. Thirdly, for workers with di¤erent
starting points the change in  experienced by di¤erent workers will be di¤erent.
Therefore the consequent growth rates in wages and hours will vary across workers
of di¤erent tenure.
In testing the relationship between hours and wages Beaudry & DiNardo (1995)
use an instrumental variable approach. They use the implications of the limited com-
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mitment solution and exploit both variations due to time of entry into a job and
cross-sectional variation in on the job wage growth associated with di¤erent cohorts
(identied by time of entry into a job). Thus they use time of entry dummy vari-
ables and year of entry cross-year dummies to instrument for wage growth. Using
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 19761989 for male heads of house-
hold Beaudry & DiNardo (1995) estimate the relationship between hours and wages
according to the equation
 lnHj;+t = 1 lnwj;+t + 2 ln zj;k;+t + 3Xj;+t + j;+t:
Hours, Hj;+t measure annual hours at date  + t of worker j hired in year  , Xj;+t
measures marital and union status and j;+t is the error term. The wage rates,
wj;+t are measured in two alternative ways, either as an annual average or as the
reported point in timeestimate from the survey information. The productivity
term zj;k;+t is decomposed into industry specic terms (k denotes the industry), and
a quadratic experience and tenure prole for each worker. The equation is estimated
in log di¤erences to account for worker specic productivity di¤erences at the time
of hiring.
They nd a statistically signicant negative relationship between hours and
wages. The test of the validity of their instrumental variable approach shows that
typically the instruments for productivity are not only a¤ecting hours through their
e¤ect on wages. However when Beaudry & DiNardo restrict data either to non-union
contracts or by excluding workers that have recently switched jobs they nd that for
these subsets the overidentication restrictions are rejected less frequently while the
coe¢ cient 1 remains signicantly negative. This o¤ers strong evidence in support
of what the limited commitment contracting model would predict. It is however,
important to recall that as mentioned above this model is not testing against an
alternative. Thus unless assumptions are made about the long-run intertemporal
elasticity of substitution this cannot be taken as evidence against the spot market
model. When the estimates for 1 are combined with the results of Beaudry &
DiNardo (1991) (discussed below in Section 3.2) this suggests that a 1% reduction
in unemployment would lead to a 34% increase in the wage rate and therefore a
reduction in hours worked of between one-half and one per cent absent changes in
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productivity. This combination would seem to give quite plausible estimates for the
change in hours.
2.3 More on quitting costs
Much of the literature assumes that quitting costs are zero (e.g., Thomas & Worrall
(1988), Beaudry & DiNardo (1991)) although the search models described below in
Section 3.1 implicitly assume there is a cost to quitting as new matches cannot be
made immediately. The basic theory considered in Section 2.1 allows for termination
costs (Cf ; Cw) which are assumed to be incurred by both parties whenever either
party terminates the relationship and goes for its outside option; as noted this
means that the termination costs can be incorporated into the outside options. If,
however, there is a direct cost to reneging on an agreement over and above necessary
economic costs, for example because of psychic, legal or reputation costs, then this
partially a¤ects the previous characterization.23 In particular, the termination rule
is less straightforward. Suppose the direct costs to reneging are pi; i = w; f (these
could be made state dependent) and ignore the costs Cf ; Cw considered earlier (or
factor them into the outside options i (st)). The self-enforcing constraints become
Vt (ht)  w (st)  pw;
t (ht)  f (st)  pf :
Suppose that after observing the current state at t, we calculate the Pareto frontier
conditional on the relationship continuing. That is, consider self-enforcing agree-
ments from state st which do not terminate immediately and calculate the frontier
from their payo¤s. If it is the case that (w(st); f (st)) lies inside this frontier
then termination is ine¢ cient and cannot occur in an e¢ cient agreement, since
by denition there is a non-terminating self-enforcing contract which could be fol-
lowed instead of termination which would be better for both parties. If however
(w(st); f (st)) lies above the frontier, then the overall frontier for this state is com-
posed of the undominated points from set composed of the restricted frontier plus
23A similar argument should apply if there were some enforced compensation on contract breach,
as it is only the cost to the reneger that matters. If however there are enforced costs on break-
up, such as redundancy payments (i.e., that are incurred even if it is agreed to terminate the
relationship), then these should be factored into the outside options.
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(w(st); f (st)). As the optimal point on the frontier is generally history dependent,
whether termination is optimal may now depend on the previous history, and so we
lose the simple termination rule of Proposition 3.24
If quitting costs are substantial, the contract will approximate one under full
commitment. Suppose however, that the rm employs many workers and that rather
than dealing with each employee bilaterally, as we have assumed so far, an employer
must treat every employee in the same way. Moreover suppose that this restriction
applies even to subsequent hires, so that they must be paid the same as incumbents
from the point they join. There is thus a single contract for all workers, and new hires
receive a continuation of this contract when they join. Provided the rm needs to hire
new workers each period, it must ensure the continuation of the contract matches
new hiresoutside options. This means, despite incumbents being committed, that
there is a participation constraint just as before, where w (s) is now the alternative
option for new hires. The analysis of this case and empirical implications have been
discussed in Martins et al. (2005). Although the worker participation constraint has
the same form as the one considered earlier, because it applies to di¤erent cohorts
at the same time, the wage dynamics and macroeconomic implications are di¤erent.
Essentially the rm, by attempting to insure incumbents, o¤ers a contract that
may not as exible as would be needed to clear the market for current job seekers.
See Snell & Thomas (2006) for an analysis of this case.
3 Endogenising the workersoutside option
As explained above in Thomas & Worrall (1988) the workers outside option w(s)
is determined by the expected discounted utility a worker would get from being
employed henceforth at the spot market wage. Thus the outside option will depend
only on the exogenous productivity process. In order to justify this assumption it
is necessary to assume that all rms can perfectly observe the workers past history
24This discussion assumes that side-payments are not possible. However, if side-payments were
feasible it may be that after observing st the contract species termination plus a payment from
one agent to another, and the penalties pi may support this to an extent (for example, the rm will
be prepared to transfer up to pf ). In this case instead of a single point (w; f ) being added to
set of payo¤s, a curve through (w; f ) determined by the trade-o¤ of the side payments between
the two agents will be added.
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and observe when a worker reneges on a contract, and punish the worker by not
o¤ering her anything other than a spot contract. An alternative assumption is that
rms treat all new workers in the same way, irrespective of whether or not they
have reneged on a previous contract. According to this view, when a worker quits
a rm, she can look for a new job o¤ering as much insurance as in the contract
from which she just quit. If however, workers and rms could move costlessly to
other contracts then no non-spot contracts could be sustained.25 Therefore it will
be necessary to assume either that there are other frictions such as search costs in
the labour market, or that rms can commit to contracts. We deal with each of
these in turn.
3.1 Search frictions
In this section we discuss two papers (Sigouin (2004), Rudanko (2006)) which embed
the above model into a matching framework to analyse the association of certain
variables with aggregate productivity. Both argue that the two-sided limited com-
mitment model performs better than full commitment models and other versions
such as spot contracts, one-sided limited commitment or continuous bargaining.
Sigouin (2004) allows hours, but not employment, to vary, while Rudanko (2006)
allows employment and vacancies to vary. However in both of these matching mod-
els there is also the possibility of an unemployment spell before a new contract is
found, so the outside option w(s) is less than the utility from a new contract.
Sigouin (2004) develops the model with variable hours by allowing the outside
option w(s) to be determined by contracts o¤ered by other rms, rather than on a
spot market as in the Thomas-Worrall model. He assumes however, that if a worker
quits from one rm he or she faces a probability of not being matched with a new
rm (even though if matching does occur, it happens without a delay) and being
unemployed.26 This is su¢ cient to drive a potential wedge between what a worker
25This assertion assumes that the surplus split in state s from a new contract is always the same.
Otherwise quitters could be punished e¤ectively by starting a new contract so that the other agent
gets all the surplus from the relationship. For example, in the Thomas-Worrall model this would
imply that punishments are as severe as consignment to trading on the spot marker, so the same
set of contracts are self-enforcing.
26There is no cost to posting a vacancy, but only a xed fraction of the unemployed are able to
make a match, or rather, to seewage o¤ers (i.e. they are nor directly matched, but are able to enter
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can get by remaining in the contract and what is available by quitting, and allows for
some insurance to be sustained. Then w(s) is determined by what a worker would
get by quitting and waiting for a job; because of competition between rms a new
job yields the worker the maximum surplus from a self-enforcing contract; however
the worker may be unlucky and su¤er unemployment, so this is also factored into
w(s).
Each worker has a total time endowment which is normalised to one, and can
supply up to this amount to a single rm at any date. The productivity per hour
worked is z(st) at time t, which is common to all rms. However there is also a
match specic shock, which can reduce productivity to zero (where it remains). If
this happens, the match is dissolved. A worker has separable preferences at t given
by
Et
1X
j=t
j t

ln(cj) +B (1  ) 1 (1 Hj)1 

;
where cj is consumption and Hj is hours supplied at time j. With separable pref-
erences the updating rule of (9) in Section 2.2 implies that each state s 2 S is
associated minimum and maximum earnings, W s and W s (W s  W s), such that
earnings are kept constant if possible and otherwise move by the smallest amount
to W s or W s. In addition earnings and hours satisfy equation (7) that the marginal
rate of substitution equals the marginal product. With the separable specication
of preference given above, it follows that
(wt+1Ht+1)B (1 Ht+1)  = z (st) :
Notice that under a full commitment contract with these preferences a risk-neutral
rm will stabilise total earnings while hours will vary procyclically with productivity
(according to the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply described above). This
leads to the (counterfactual, given the very weak empirical correlation) conclusion
that the wage rate is perfectly negatively correlated with hours supplied. On the
into a contract, whereas the unlucky ones cannot). This implies that the unemployment rate does
not vary. Essentially he posits a matching function where the matching or seeing probability
does not depend on the number of vacancies but only on the number seeking work. Moreover,
although each entrepreneur can only match with a single worker, there are more entrepreneurs
than workers so that competition between entrepreneurs for the fraction of unemployed workers
who can see o¤ers drives prots down to zero.
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other hand under a spot labour contract, where the wage is always equal to pro-
ductivity z (st), these preferences have the property that income and substitution
e¤ects of a wage change cancel out (assuming that all income is labour income and
there are no taxes, and maintaining the assumption of no borrowing/saving). In
this case hours do not vary at all with the wage or productivity (this contradicts the
positive correlation between hours and productivity typically found in the data).
As described in Section 2.2 the situation will, however, be somewhat di¤erent
when there are enforcement constraints, and the result is a mixing of the above
two extremes. For relatively small changes in productivity (and assuming that
earnings are not already up against the constraint that tightens) such that wtHt 2
[W st+1 ;W st+1 ], so neither constraint is binding with strictly positive shadow value,
the rule says that earnings stay constant, so there is no income e¤ect, and hours
change with productivity according to the intertemporal elasticity of supply. On
the other hand, if the change is large enough that a constraint binds, then earnings
change and there will be an income e¤ect which reduces to an extent the change in
hours. For example, a large increase in productivity may imply only a small increase
in hours if earnings rise substantially, so the wage will also rise.27 In this case there
is a positive correlation. The overall e¤ect may then be that the correlation is very
weak, in accordance with the evidence.
Rudanko (2006) also embeds the basic model in a model of search. She addresses
issues recently raised by Shimer (2005) who argues that the Mortensen-Pissarides
model cannot account for the magnitude of unemployment and vacancy uctuations
without assuming unrealistically high volatility in productivity. Hall (2005) argues
that some form of wage rigidity may be su¢ cient to solve this puzzle. The Sigouin
model holds unemployment and vacancies xed, so cannot address these issues.
Rudanko looks at di¤erent versions of a contracting model in a directed search model
of the labour market, following Moen (1997), rather than the random matching
model typically used in this literature. The model has similarities with the Sigouin
model in that match specic productivity is composed (as the product of) a common
(economy wide) component and match component that is unity initially, but transits
27This depends on how [W st+1 ;W st+1 ] varies with zt+1 but Sigouin shows through numerical
simulations that the intuition will be correct in many situations.
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to an absorbing state of 0 with a xed probability each period. As in Sigouin, when
this occurs, the match dissolves and the worker looks for a new job. Likewise there
are a large number of risk-neutral entrepreneurs operating under constant returns
to scale. (Unlike Sigouin, however, hours are xed, although in the US the extensive
margin is more important in accounting for total hours variation than the intensive
one.) The model is one of competitive search: At the start of each period, after
observing the current aggregate productivity level, rms can choose to post an o¤er
of a wage contract, but have to pay a cost k for keeping a vacancy open. Worker
search can be directed to a particular wage contract . There is a matching function
dened as follows: if there is a measure Nu of unemployed agents searching for 
and measure Nv of vacancies o¤ering , the measure of matches taking place this
period is given by a Cobb-Douglas matching function
m(Nu; Nv) = KN

uN
1 
v
where 0 < K < 1 and 0 <  < 1. Dening  = Nv=Nu to be the vacancy unem-
ployment ratio (labour market tightness), the probability that a worker nds a
contract  this period is m () := m(Nu; Nv)=Nu, and the corresponding probability
for an entrepreneur is q () := m(Nu; Nv)=Nv. Thus the payo¤ to a worker from
searching for  is
 ((z))V(z) + (1   ((z)))Vu(z)
where V(z) is the discounted worker utility from nding a job with contract , while
Vu(z) is the corresponding utility from being unemployed, where both are functions
of the prevailing aggregate state z: Vu(z) is the discounted utility from consuming
the unemployment benet today and searching again tomorrow. Likewise V(z) is
just the expression given in the original model for contract utility with a stochastic
termination added, at which point the worker gets Vu (z0) if z0 is the current state as
she is unemployed for a period and then has to seek a new job. The rms prot per
job will depend on the probability that a job is lled, q (), and equals q ((z))F(z) 
k where F(z) is the discounted prot from ; but this is only achieved if a match
occurs, but the vacancy cost k must be incurred in any case. Because of competition
among entrepreneurs, this prot is driven to zero in equilibrium. The self-enforcing
constraints specify that a worker cannot gain by leaving the contract, which requires
that continuation utility must not be below Vu(z0) (the worker is unemployed for
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at least a period), and again that the continuation prots of the entrepreneur are
non-negative. In addition, for equilibrium to obtain it must be the case that there
is no other contract that could be o¤ered which would o¤er greater prots, where
the corresponding  will equate the returns to workers from searching in either
market.28 As in Sigouin, the model endogenises the workers outside option so that
it depends on what she would get by starting a new contract, but again the risk of
unemployment (here it will last at least one period) is a su¢ cient deterrent to allow
non-spot contracts to be sustained.
The model is calibrated to U.S. data, and the volatilities of real wages and of the
vacancy-unemployment ratio are analysed. Not surprisingly, if there is commitment
in the wage contract then wages vary too little with productivity (only new matches
are responsible for any variability). The model only comes close to matching the
respective empirical correlations of the wage and the vacancy-unemployment ratio
with productivity in the two-sided limited commitment model if the replacement
ratio is around 80%, which is considerably higher than usually assumed (although
Rudanko argues that this is not necessarily an unreasonable number). Intuitively,
to get the wage to vary su¢ ciently, the workers outside option constraint must
bind su¢ ciently frequently; this requires workers to be relatively indi¤erent between
working and not working.29
3.2 One-sided limited commitment
We next consider the inuential paper by Beaudry & DiNardo (1991) (hereafter
BD91). They develop a model of labour contracting where a risk-neutral rm o¤ers
insurance to risk-averse employees, but there is no worker commitment and un-
like the search models considered above a worker who quits can immediately start
work elsewhere (perfect mobility). In terms of our model above, they assume that
Cf = 1 (rm commitment) and Cw = 0 with w (st) given by the utility from
28Rudanko shows that only a single contract is ever o¤ered to new matches in equilibrium.
Moreover, it is equivalent to a model with undirected search in which a weighted Nash product
of surpluses (relative to (Vu (z) ; 0)) is maximised, with weights proportional to the exponents in
the matching function, i.e.,  and 1  . So the competitive search framework appears not to be
crucial to the results.
29The model actually does better as risk-aversion tends to zero; this may be taken as support
for the type of hold-up model analysed by MacLeod & Malcomson (1993).
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starting a new job (perfect labour mobility). We derive their basic characterisation,
which is a generalisation of Holmstrom (1983) who considered a two-period model.
We then describe the other ingredients of their model which lead to empirically
testable predictions, and nally we discuss the empirical evidence. Their work is
particularly important for two reasons. First, they provide strong evidence in favour
of the perfect mobility model. Secondly, the paper addresses how wages respond to
unemployment levels over the business cycle. There is a voluminous literature that
examines how real wages respond to contemporaneous movements in unemployment
which generally has not found a very strong relationship, but the results in BD91
suggest that this literature may have been looking at the wrong business cycle vari-
able. If one looks at the lowest unemployment rate since a worker started a job, this
appears to show a much stronger e¤ect.
Given that Cf = 1; we can treat the value of ws derived in Section 2.1 as
being innite. (Alternatively, we can just ignore the rms constraint in all the
above arguments, so Lemma 1 directly asserts that wages cannot fall, etc.). Thus
the intervals for e¢ cient wages become [ws;1): The ratchet nature of wages follows
from Proposition 3: wt+1 = wst+1 if wt < wst+1 ; and otherwise wt+1 = wt: To pin
down the values for the ws, we need to specify the process for w (st) and how the
contractual surplus is split between worker and rm.
BD91 assume that there are a large number of identical rms and workers, with
new workers entering each period to replenish the labour force, replacing workers
who die.30 It is assumed further that because rms operate under constant returns to
scale, competition for workers drives prots for a new worker to zero, so any surplus
goes to the worker. A worker who quits a rm can immediately seek employment
with another rm. Moreover the only source of uncertainty is the common shock
to productivity each period. What this implies is that w(st), the utility of the
workers outside option, equals the utility from an optimal contract which generates
zero prots.31 Given the updating rule, it is then possible to calculate the initial
30BD91 also have rm death, but we shall abstract from this in the exposition that follows.
31BD91 express the workers participation constraint equivalently as the fact that the contract
must never o¤er strictly positive prots, looking forward from any point if it did then the worker
would be bid away.
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wage of a contract starting in state s for which discounted expected wages and
discounted expected productivity are equal. This must therefore be ws.
What is perhaps surprising at rst glance is how it is possible to o¤er any
insurance at all when the worker can quit and restart the contract at a di¤erent
rm, without any penalty.32 Normally in repeated game models of cooperation
players are induced to take short-term sub-optimal actions (such as paying out on
insurance) by the promise of long-term rewards relative to reneging on this, which
yields termination. But here a worker who quits is able to immediately start a
new contract with a di¤erent rm so that whenever productivity is such that the
contract demands a sacrice by the worker, the worker can quit. The resolution
of this apparent paradox is that contracts demand up-front payments by workers
in that initially the worker receives a wage below productivity, to be compensated
later by the likelihood of wages above productivity.33,34
In order to get testable restrictions, it is necessary to link the productivity
level in the theoretical model to an observable variable. Notice that the optimal
wage contract depends only on the productivity process a very convenient feature.
Moreover the labour market must always clear, since at the point of hiring there
are no restrictions on wages. However when productivity is high, the wage and
expected utility for a new entrant is high. BD91 posit an alternative sector in
which a worker could be employed which is subject to a (xed) decreasing returns
technology. Thus a new entrant to the labour market faces a choice between a period
in the alternative sector and then getting a contract, versus getting a contract in the
original sector right away (by construction of the equilibrium, once a worker has a
contract, the option of moving to the alternative sector will o¤er the same as a new
contract, and so is always weakly dominated due to the participation constraint).
In equilibrium workers will be indi¤erent (there are always some workers employed
in the alternative sector) so a high wage in the original sector must go along with
32In fact this intuition is correct in the two-sided case where the rm could also terminate the
relationship costlessly. In the Sigouin and Rudanko models discussed above, there is the possibility
of unemployment if a worker quits, and this is su¢ cient to support non-trivial contracts.
33This issue has been explored by Krueger & Uhlig (2006) in a general risk-sharing context where
both parties to the contract are risk averse.
34The feature that workers initially receive wages below productivity with a rising wage prole
is of course reminiscent of the agency models where rising wages provide incentives for e¤ort, see
e.g. Lazear (1981).
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a low level of employment in the alternative sector (due to decreasing returns, this
raises the wage), or equivalently, high employment in the original sector. BD91
associate high employment in the original sector with low unemployment.35 Putting
this together, high wages go together with high unemployment levels.
BD91 conclude, then, that with no worker commitment (perfect mobility),
where the worker is free to quit at any point, the wage follows a ratchet like process,
rising whenever the labour market is tighter than hitherto (since the worker joined
the rm), but staying constant otherwise; hence the current wage is determined
by the tightest labour market during a workers tenure. Tightness of the labour
market is measured by how low the unemployment rate is. In testing, this perfect
mobility model does better than two alternatives: a spot market model in which
current unemployment determines wages, and a full commitment model in which
unemployment at the time of hiring is the determining factor. In the spot market
model, wages are determined solely by the value of a workers current marginal prod-
uct, in the full-commitment contracting model, wages are constant but the level is
determined by the workers outside opportunity at the point at which he/she joins
the rm. Beaudry & DiNardo (1991) test these three models against each other
on U.S. data (PSID/Current Population Survey (CPS)). Perhaps surprisingly, the
latter model appears to perform much better than the other two, which we describe
in more detail:
Commitment: a binding contract is signed when the worker joins a rm. Be-
cause the worker is risk-averse, the risk-neutral rm acts as an insurance company,
completely stabilising wages. (This results from our above general model by impos-
ing Cw =1; so that ws =  1:) In equilibrium workers will be o¤ered a xed wage
contract (where the wage will equal the expected discounted value of a workers pro-
ductivity so rms make zero prots). The wage will be xed at a level corresponding
to conditions at the point the worker joins the rm it equals the best estimate of a
workers lifetime productivity, and under the assumed productivity process this will
depend only on his productivity at this point, which is, as explained above, proxied
by the unemployment rate, Ut, at that point.
35It is tempting to interpret the alternative sector as leisure or some sort of household production,
although the decreasing returns to total labour input makes this interpretation di¢ cult.
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Spot market contract: no long-term contract is possible, so this implies that
wt = z (st). (If a rm o¤ered say a xed wage contract, then whenever the wage was
less than z (st) the worker could just walk away, and go to another rm, while if the
wage was greater than z (st) the rm could sack the worker.) Thus wages uctuate
with z (st) which is proxied by Ut:
The general model can be expressed as follows: the natural log of the real wage
for worker j at time  + t for a worker who started the job at time  satises:
lnwj;+t = 1Xj;+t + 2C( ; t) + "j;+t
where Xj;+t is a vector of individual variables36, 1 is the vector of coe¢ cients on
these variables, "j;+t is an error term, and 2 is the coe¢ cient on the business cycle
(i.e., unemployment) variable, with the 3 possibilities for the business cycle variable
C( ; t) being:
C( ; t) =
8><>:
U+t spot market model
U fully binding contract
minfU+k; k = 0; 1; : : : ; tg non-binding on worker
where the unemployment rate is denoted by U; with U the rate prevailing at the
start of the job and U+t the rate at time  + t where t denotes tenure with the
employer.
The results are striking. In some specications37 in which all three variables are
included, the coe¢ cient on the minimum unemployment rate is the only correctly
signed (i.e., negative) signicant one (PSID, no xed e¤ects), and in all specications
it is much larger than the other coe¢ cients, implying that a 1% drop in the minimum
unemployment rate (e.g., from 4% to 3%) leads to an increase in current wages of
between 3% and 8%.
The implications for our understanding of real wage cyclicality are considerable.
Typically studies have looked at how wages respond to contemporaneous unemploy-
ment movements. For example, using the PSID for men over the period of 1968-69
to 86-87, Solon, Barsky & Parker (1994) found that a one percentage point reduction
36For individual characteristics, BD91 used experience, experience squared, how much schooling,
job tenure, and dummies for industry, region, race, union status, marriage, and metropolitan area
(SMSA).
37See Table 2 of their paper.
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of the unemployment rate leads to a rise in the real wage rate of workers who stayed
in their jobs by 1.2 percent (movers appear to be subject to greater procyclical
wage movements). Similar estimates are found in Shin (1994) and Devereux (2001).
BD91s results suggest that the response of wages to the minimum unemployment
rate is substantially larger. On the other hand, as argued in Grant (2003), because
the minimum unemployment rate does not actually vary as much as contempora-
neous unemployment (consider a worker whose minimum value occurred early in a
job spell), minimum unemployment may not explain very much of the variability of
aggregate wages over the business cycle.
Several recent empirical studies have largely conrmed the robustness of BD91s
main empirical ndings over di¤erent periods and using di¤erent datasets, that the
minimum rate of unemployment since hiring is a statistically important determinant
of the current wage of an individual (McDonald & Worswick 1999, Grant 2003, Shin
& Shin 2007, Devereux & Hart 2007). Both Grant (2003), and Devereux & Hart
(2007, Current Issue), however, nd more of a role for the current unemployment
rate than did BD91. Grant (2003) extends BD91s analysis (using six cohorts from
the National Longitudinal Surveys) to cover the time period 1966 to 1998. He nds
that the signicance and importance of minu is broadly robust with respect to the
addition of xed time dummies (to rule out any e¤ects coming through macroeco-
nomic variables, and thus the coe¢ cient onminu is estimated only through variation
across individuals in each year), of tenure dummies (to capture nonlinear tenure ef-
fects), a tenure-unemployment interaction term (to capture tenure e¤ects that vary
over the business cycle), and using sub-samples selected on the basis of age, and sex.
As mentioned, however, current unemployment levels also have some explanatory
power.
A somewhat di¤erent methodology was adopted by Shin & Shin (2007), us-
ing the PSID for the period 1974-91, which includes one business cycle more than
BD91. They run the BD91 regressions over the whole period and get very similar
results but as Grant does, they also nd more signicant results for contempora-
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neous unemployment.38 ;39 They also estimate a complementary econometric model,
only using the current unemployment rate as a business cycle regressor, but look
for asymmetric e¤ects of tight labour markets. Thus they split a job history into
periods of tightening and loosening labour markets, and subdivide the former cate-
gory into two sub-categories, when unemployment is falling but above its minimum
for the current job, and when it is below the minimum. Tenure is measured with
considerable error in the PSID; thus a mismeasurement in tenure may lead to an
incorrect value for minu, used in BD91s estimation, whereas here it will lead to the
respective periods when unemployment is falling but below or respectively above the
historical minimum, to be measured incorrectly. It is argued that the former is more
likely to be problematical. The results are that most of the wage adjustment occurs
in periods when the unemployment rate falls below the historical minimum level
observed since the start of the current job in accordance with the perfect mobility
model (according to the model, wages should be constant in other periods): For the
sample of male household heads, the estimated coe¢ cient on the unemployment rate
is -0.026 (i.e., a one percentage point reduction in the unemployment rate is associ-
ated with a 2.64 percent rise in real wages). The coe¢ cient on unemployment when
it is falling but not below the historical minimum is much smaller at -.0076, but not
signicant. For periods of contraction, the coe¢ cient is smaller and insignicant.
So again there is a strong conrmation of the perfect mobility model. They also
conrm the ndings of other studies that the wages of job stayers are procyclical,
but less so than those of movers.
38In comparing their estimates with those of Grant, it is interesting to note that the PSID sample
has a higher average age than the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth used by Grant except for
the NLSY Older Men. Estimates in Table 2 of Grant (2003) show that the e¤ect of the minimum
unemployment rate on current wages dominates those of the other unemployment variables more
in the NLSY Older Mencohort than in Young Menor Women,and the Older Menresults
are closest to the PSID estimates. This suggests that the BD91 model may work better for older
workers.
39Shin & Shin (2007) include a trend, which might matter as the period studied has a generally
rising unemployment rate, so that the a jobs minimum unemployment rate is negatively correlated
with time elapsed since the date at which the minimum is attained; as wages are rising omitting
this trend might overstate the e¤ect of the minimum unemployment rate. However it makes little
di¤erence, as one would anticipate from Grants analysis with time dummies. Likewise, to rule
out nonlinear e¤ects of tenure they nd that the addition a squared tenure term does not matter
to the worker xed e¤ect model (although it does to the no-xed e¤ects specication); again this
conrms Grants ndings.
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4 Closing comments
We presented an overview of models of self-enforcing labour contracts in which
risk-sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A basic two-agent
(rm-worker) model was developed which is su¢ ciently general to encompass the
problem considered in most of the literature. We have shown how the solution can
be characterised using local variational arguments and therefore avoided the need to
establish more complex technical properties of optimum value functions. We have
considered how the outside option of the worker is made endogenous in competitive
or search markets and considered some of the implications for aggregate hours and
wages and productivity and what empirical support exists for the model. The broad
conclusion is that the self-enforcing contractual model does help explain some of
the observed empirical regularities better than a spot market or full commitment
alternatives. There is fairly strong support from a variety of sources and data of the
one-sided limited commitment model where workers outside options are determined
competitively.
There remain some issues for further study. A weakness of the empirical tests
has been to discriminate against alternative assumptions of capital market imper-
fections, such as credit constraints for employees, or alternative contracting explana-
tions based on hold-up rather than risk aversion. The general success of the empirical
method however suggests that it will be useful to explore whether the model can
help explain observed patterns in wages at the rm level where it is typically found
that larger rms pay higher wages and fast growing rms pay lower wages. An
approach along these lines combining contracts with rm credit constraints can be
found in Michelacci & Quadrini (2005).
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